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Disputes between the EU institutions and the 
Member States are still abounding in the area of 
EU external relations law, despite the Lisbon 
Treaty’s objective to simplify and rationalise. 
Most of these cases raise the question of 
competence. The latest inter-institutional dispute 
brought before the Court of Justice of the EU is no 
different: In Commission v Council of the EU (C-
24/20) the Commission reproaches the Council for 
having authorised all Member States to accede to 
an international law instrument that squarely 
comes under EU exclusive competence. This will 
be a landmark case. Apart from its implications for 
EU external relations law, this case offers the 
Court of Justice an opportunity to shed light on 
cross-cutting legal questions such as the Council 
of the EU’s competence to amend Commission 
proposals, the importance of institutional balance 
and the conditions under which Member States are 
authorised to exercise EU exclusive competences. 
 
Background 
In Commission v Council (C-24/20) the 
Commission is challenging Council Decision 
2019/1754 on the accession of the European 
Union to the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement 
on Appellations of Origin and Geographical 
Indications. In that Decision, the Council 
approved the EU’s accession and also authorised 
all of the Member States ‘which wish to do so’ to 
become party to this agreement alongside the EU. 
This is remarkable because the Court of Justice 
had earlier ruled that the Geneva Act falls squarely 
within the EU’s Common Commercial Policy and 
therefore within EU exclusive competence. While 
the Council accepted the EU’s exclusive 
competence for the agreement, it still diverted 
from the Commission’s proposal that only foresaw 
the EU’s accession to the Geneva Act. The 
Council did so for two reasons: firstly, the Geneva 
Act amends the Lisbon Agreement to which seven 
EU Member States were already contracting 
parties. Secondly, like most international 
agreements that allow international organisations 
to become parties, the Geneva Act provides that 
the international organisation in question is 
entitled to the same number of votes as the 
combined number of its member states (that are 
also party to the agreement). Although decision-
making is normally by consensus, the more EU 
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Member States that become party to it, the more 
votes the EU will be able to cast in the Assembly 
of the Special Union created by the Lisbon 
Agreement. 
 
The notion of amendment 
The Commission invokes a violation of Article 
218(6) TFEU in conjunction with Article 293(1) 
TFEU. These provisions prescribe that the 
Council can only act pursuant to a formal proposal 
of the Commission, and that if the Council wishes 
to amend Commission proposals it can only do so 
unanimously. The argument of the Commission 
here seems to be that the Council adopted a 
Decision that was so contrary to what the 
Commission had proposed that one cannot speak 
of ‘amendment’ anymore. The question of when 
certain modifications of a Commission proposal 
cannot be qualified anymore as ‘amendments’, has 
only once been put to the Court of Justice. But in 
that case the Court explicitly noted that it did not 
have to address that question to solve the case 
before it. The Commission’s present argument 
also links up with the earlier MFA case in which 
the Court ruled that the Commission can 
exceptionally withdraw its proposal if the Council 
intends to amend a proposal in such a way that one 
of its essential elements is distorted ‘in a manner 
irreconcilable with the objective pursued by that 
proposal.’ 
In the present case, the Commission probably 
thought that it would not be expedient to withdraw 
its proposal (assuming the MFA test was met) as 
that would have meant that the EU would not be 
able to accede to the Geneva Act either.  
 
The principle of institutional balance 
The Commission alleges that the Council has also 
infringed the notion of institutional balance under 
Article 13(2) TEU. The principle of institutional 
balance has become a classic argument in any 
inter-institutional dispute before the Court of 
Justice. Unfortunately, its scope, function and 
content remain unclear and it is uncertain whether 
it is an actionable principle of EU law. Rather, 
what typically happens in inter-institutional 
disputes is that the Court looks into whether a 
specific (procedural) provision in the Treaties has 
been respected and if not/so it automatically 
concludes that the institutional balance has 
not/indeed been respected (for example, in C-
425/13). Unless the Court elaborates a different 
reasoning in this case, the institutional balance 
will again not acquire a self-standing function. It 
would remain a mere shorthand for referring to the 
requirements flowing from specific Treaty 
provision(s) of relevance in the case at hand. 
 
The authorisation of Member States 
When the Lisbon Treaty introduced the catalogue 
of competences it also explicitly provided in 
Article 2(1) TFEU that Member States may be 
authorised to act in an area of EU exclusive 
competences. In the present case, the Commission 
had noted that it might have accepted an 
amendment exceptionally allowing the Member 
States that are parties to the Lisbon Agreement to 
be granted the authorisation to also accede to the 
Geneva Act but that an authorisation for all the 
Member States is unwarranted. As already noted, 
the reason given by the Council was rather 
practical. The question thus raised is whether the 
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authorisations envisaged in Article 2(1) TFEU 
ought to be exceptional and whether practical 
reasons such as those invoked by the Council are 
permitted to justify such authorisations. Under 
established jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, 
practical reasons cannot affect the competence 
question. At the same time, competence is not a 
question here as the Council recognises that only 
the EU holds competence in casu. Then again, is 
the competence question (which cannot depend on 
practical considerations) not circumvented by 
authorising (for practical reasons) Member States 
to act in an area of exclusive EU competence? 
 
Functional mixity? 
Finally, because of the practical reasons which the 
Council will presumably advance, this case might 
invite the Court of Justice to look into the idea of 
functional mixity suggested in doctrine. The 
Council decided in favour of mixed action and it 
will invoke the international law context to justify 
this choice. This would follow up on the recent 
MPA Antarctic case where the Court seems to 
have accepted the relevance of international law 
for the question of the exercise of EU competence, 
albeit in an area of shared competence. Here it 
should be stressed again that the Commission 
originally proposed that only the EU would accede 
to the Geneva Act. As noted, the latter provides 
that an international organisation has as many 
votes as its member states that are parties to the 
Act. But if only the EU is a party it would not 
enjoy any voting rights which would not only 
hamper its own effectiveness in the Special Union 
but might also frustrate the operation of the 
Special Union and the application of the Geneva 
Act. Could this consequence (under international 
law) of EU-only action then be a reason for the 
Court to accept (or even require) mixed action by 
both the EU and its Member States in an area 
coming under EU exclusive competence? 
 
Merijn Chamon is Assistant Professor of EU Law 
at Maastricht University. The author would like to 
thank Isabelle Van Damme and Ayana Dootalieva 
for their comments on an earlier draft. Any errors 
or omissions remain his own.  
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